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The Constitutionality of Louisiana's Anti-Abortion
Statutes After Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
The recent Supreme Court decision of Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services' will have a major impact on any state wishing to restrict abortion.
Louisiana lawmakers responded quickly to the court's change in position.
During the Second Extraordinary Session of 1989, the legislature passed
House Concurrent Resolution No. 10 to "express the intent of the Leg-
islature of Louisiana that the district attorneys of this state shall enforce
the criminal statutes pertaining to abortion ... to the fullest extent per-
mitted by and consistent with the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court."' 2 Also adopted was a House Study Request
directed to the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure that they
might examine Webster and make recommendations to the legislature for
possible changes in Louisiana abortion laws.'
This paper will analyze the Webster decision to determine its effect
on Louisiana abortion laws. The first section will discuss six abortion
issues decided before Webster. An exposition of these issues is important
to help the reader understand exactly what effect Webster has on prior
jurisprudence. The six issues discussed are the criminalization of abortions;
the prohibition on the use of public funds, employees, and hospitals for
the performance of abortions; the requirement of parental and spousal
consent or notification; viability determinations and post-viability abortions;
the requirement of informed consent; and the regulation of the place where
the abortion is performed. This article will also include an analysis of the
Webster decision. The parameters of the restrictions granted to states will
be a primary consideration in this discussion. The next section includes
an analysis of Louisiana abortion laws on the same issues, including a
discussion of their constitutionality both before and after Webster. Finally,
additions and changes will be suggested to allow these laws to coincide
with the limits of Webster.
I. FEDERAL LBrs ON ANTI-ABORTION STATUTES-
FROM ROE TO Webster
A. Roe and its Progeny
1. Criminalization
The Roe v. Wad& decision has been exhaustively analyzed
Copyright 1990, by LoUIsIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
2. H.C.R. Res. 10, 1989 Leg., 2d Spec. Sess.
3. House Study Request, 1989 Leg., 2d Spec. Sess.
4. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
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elsewhere5 and need not be reviewed here. A few basic points, however,
may be emphasized. The Court in Roe struck down a statute that made
all abortions illegal, except those performed to save the life of the mother.
Extending a familiar privacy right to the abortion decision, 6 the Court
recognized that a woman's right to choose an abortion is not absolute, but
must be balanced against competing state interests-protecting maternal health
and potential life. The Court refused to recognize a fetus as life from the
moment of conception, hence implicating the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. They instead considered a fetus only as a potential
life. They found that a state has an interest in protecting maternal health
and potential life but "[tihat these interests are separate and distinct. Each
grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during
pregnancy, each becomes 'compelling." ' ' 7 In order to balance these competing
state interests against the compelling privacy rights of the mother, the Court
set up a "trimester" approach to abortion regulation.
During the first trimester, the state has no interest in potential life or
maternal health, thus the abortion decision must be left to the pregnant
woman and her attending physician. During the second trimester the state
does have an interest in protecting the health of the mother; therefore, the
state can regulate the abortion procedure, but only to the extent that it
"reasonably relates to ... maternal health." '8 Finally, the Court found that
following viability, the point at which the fetus is capable "of meaningful
life outside the mother's womb," 9 the state's interest in potential life becomes
compelling; thus, the state may prohibit abortion except in cases where the
mother's life or health is in danger.
After Roe, states could no longer enforce statutes making all abortions
illegal. Because a state's interest in potential life is significantly recognized
only after the second trimester, any abortion performed before that time
cannot be illegal.
2. Prohibition on the Use of Public Funds, Employees, and
Hospitals for the Performance of Abortions
According to the United States Supreme Court,' 0 states that partic-
ipate in the Medical Assistance Program are not required to fund
5. See Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1410 (1974) and Note,
The Abortion Cases: A Return to Lochner, or a New Substantive Due Process?, 37 Alb.
L. Rev. 776 (1973).
6. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972) (concerned the right
of unmarried persons to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85
S. Ct. 1678 (1965) (concerned the right of married persons to use contraceptives); and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925) (concerned the right of
parents to enroll their students in private schools).
7. 410 U.S. at 162-63, 93 S. Ct. at 731.
8. Id. at 163, 93 S. Ct. at 732.
9. Id., 93 S. Ct. at 732.
10. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
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nonmedically necessary abortions under Title XIX of the Social Security
Act.1" The Court reasoned that, although a state may not impose unduly
burdensome restrictions on the abortion procedure until after the second
trimester, the state does have a legitimate and significant interest in
potential life throughout the pregnancy. They reasoned that a state could
encourage childbirth over abortion through selective allocation of public
funds.
A related issue concerned whether under the equal protection clause
a state participating in the program was required by the Constitution
to pay for the expenses related to abortion during the first trimester
when it paid for those related to childbirth. The Court held that indigent
pregnant women were not members of a suspect class and that im-
pingement of a fundamental right was not involved.' 2 Roe held that a
state may not impose unduly burdensome restrictions on a woman's
right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy but it did not give
her an unqualified right to an abortion.'3 Accordingly, the equal pro-
tection claim could be overcome by only a rational interest. The Court
determined that encouraging childbirth was such an interest.' 4
Another case'5 concerned the adoption of the Hyde Amendment, an
amendment to Title XIX that provided that the federal government is
not required to reimburse states for abortion except when the pregnancy
results from rape or incest, or when the mother's life is in danger. The
Court first determined that the Medicaid program is a cooperative effort
of the Federal government and participating states. As such, the state
does not have to unilaterally fund the abortion when the Federal gov-
ernment refuses to allow funds for that purpose. On the due process
claim against the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment itself, the
Court, in discussing the privacy rights guaranteed by Roe, said, "[I]t
simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with
it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself
of the full range of protected choices.' 16 The Court reasoned that while
a state may not place restrictions on the woman's right to choose an
abortion, "it need not remove those not of its own creation.' ' 7 As to
the equal protection claim, the Court found that indigence was not a
suspect classification nor was the abortion fundamental. Thus a state's
rational interest in encouraging childbirth over abortion could overcome
the claim.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1983).
12. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
13. Id. at 473-74, 97 S. Ct. at 2382.
14. For a discussion of restriction on funds for abortion, see Note, Beal v. Doe,
Maher v. Roe, and Non-Therapeutic Abortions: The State Does Not Have To Pay The
Bill, 9 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 288 (1977).
15. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
16. Id. at 316, 100 S. Ct. at 2688.
17. Id., 100 S. Ct. at 2688.
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On the issue of the use of public hospitals for the performance of
abortions, the Court held that it is not a violation of equal protection
for a city or a state to provide publicly funded hospitals for childbirth
but not for abortion, reasoning again that a state has a rational interest
in encouraging childbirth."
3. Parental Consent or Notification
Neither a spouse nor a parent has the absolute right to veto a
pregnant woman's decision to undergo an abortion. 9 However, recent
Supreme Court cases have held that a state may provide for judicial
by-pass of the abortion decision. A state may require that a pregnant
minor obtain parental consent absent proof that she is mature or eman-
cipated or that despite her immaturity or lack of emancipation an
abortion is in her best interest.20 The Court has held that unemancipated
immature minors may be required to notify their parents of their intent
to abort. 21 The notification requirement serves the goal of preserving
family integrity, protecting the pregnant minor, and "providing an op-
portunity for parents to supply essential medical and other information
to a physician. '22 There have been no Supreme Court cases on spousal
notification. Lower courts, however, have held this requirement invalid. 23
4. Viability Determinations and Post-Viability Abortions
A provision requiring a physician to use his experience, judgment,
and professional competence to determine whether a fetus is viable or
may be viable was held to be impermissibly vague. 24 If the physician
believed the fetus was viable or might be viable, he was required to
18. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977).
19. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
20. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979); Akron v. Akron
Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983); and Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
21. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981).
22. Id. at 411, 101 S. Ct. at 1172.
23. See Planned Parenthood of R.I. v. Bd. of Medical Rev., 598 F. Supp. 625 (D.
R.I. 1984), where the court found no compelling state interest; and Doe v. Deschamps,
461 F. Supp. 682 (D. Mont. 1976) where the court found the spousal notification facially
unconstitutional because it failed to provide the method for giving notice. See also
Scheinberg v. Smith, 659"F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981), where the court found that the state
did have an interest in protecting the husband's interest in the procreative potential of
the marriage. However, they remanded to determine whether the provision was narrowly
drawn, that is, whether there was more than a de minimis risk that the wife's future
childbearing capacity would be hindered because of the abortion. On remand, Scheinberg
v. Smith, 550 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D. Fla. 1982), the court determined that the risk was
only de minimis.
24. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
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use the same degree of care to preserve the life of the fetus, that is,
he was to use the degree of care he would use if the fetus were to be
born rather then aborted. Failure to discharge this duty subjected the
physician to criminal liability. The Court held that the provision was
unconstitutionally ambiguous. It failed to specify that the duty became
operative only after viability, hence, the physician would conceivably be
subject to criminal liability for any abortion performed throughout preg-
nancy.
Because Roe commands that post-viability abortions be allowed when
the life or health of the mother is in danger, 25 a state may wish to
impose certain standards on these abortions. The Court has held that
a state may not require a "trade-off" between the health of the woman
and fetal survival.2 6 That is, a state may not require a physician to use
an abortion technique that increases the chance of fetal survival, but
also increases the health risks to the mother. The provision in question
provided that the abortion technique to be used in post-viability abortions
should be one that affords the unborn child the best opportunity of
survival unless it would place a significantly greater health risk on the
mother.
Finally, a state may wish to provide that a second physician be
present during a post-viability abortion to care for the infant. The Court
has held that these restrictions are constitutional as long as the statute
creates an exception for emergencies. 27
5. Informed Consent
Physicians may constitutionally be required to inform the pregnant,
woman of the abortion procedure and consequences whenever the abor-
tion is performed despite the fact that Roe disallowed a state from
interfering with the abortion decision during the first trimester. 28 The
Court stated that
[t]he decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a
stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made
with full knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman
is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of the decision
25. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65, 93 S. Ct. 705, 732 (1973).
26. Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 768, 106 S. Ct.
2169, 2183 (1986). See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 99 S. Ct. 675 (1979).
27. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983)
(where a second physician requirement was found to be constitutional as it included an
exception for emergencies); compare Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst., 476 U.S.
747, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986) (where the second physician requirement was held unconsti-
tutional because it did not include an exception for emergencies).
28. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
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and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State
to the extent of requiring her prior written consent. 29
A state may require that a pregnant woman be informed of the
abortion method to be employed, the risks associated with it, instructions
to follow subsequent to the abortion, and any other information the
physician deems relevant to her decision to abort or carry the child to
term.30 However, despite the fact that Roe required that the decision
to abort be left to the doctor and his patient, the Court has held that
a state may not require the physician to be the one to give the infor-
mation.3 The Court reasoned that the critical issue was whether the
woman received the information, not the person who gave it, although
they did hold that a state may set minimum qualifications for the person
who imparts it.2
A state may not require the pregnant woman be informed that
assistance is available for prenatal care, neonatal care, and childbirth
and that the father is required to assist in the support of the child.33
A requirement that the pregnant woman be informed that she may
review a list of agencies that offer alternatives to abortion and that she
may receive information about the development of the fetus at her
request have also been held unconstitutional.14 The Court has reasoned
that such requirements are "designed not to inform the woman's consent
but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether," 35 and they are
unacceptable attempts to structure the dialogue between the pregnant
woman and her physician.
6. Regulation of the Place Where the Abortion is Performed
Roe granted the states the right to regulate the abortion procedure
after the first trimester in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health.3 6 Requirements that all abortions after the first trimester be
performed in a full-service hospital are unconstitutional because such a
requirement is not necessarily related to maternal health.3 7 The Court
29. Id. at 67, 96 S. Ct. at 2840.
30. Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S. Ct. 2481
(1983).
31. Id. at 448, 103 S. Ct. at 2502.
32. Id., 103 S. Ct. at 2502.
33. Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 760-61, 106 S.
Ct. 2169, 2179 (1986).
34. Id. at 759-64, 106 S. Ct. at 2178-80.
35. Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444, 103 S. Ct. 2481,
2500 (1983).
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163, 93 S. Ct. 705, 731-32 (1973).
37. 462 U.S. at 431-39, 103 S. Ct. at 2493-97. See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n
v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
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found that one popular method of abortion during the early weeks of
the second trimester is the dilation and evacuation method that can be
performed safely in an outpatient setting.3" States may require, however,
that the abortion be performed in a licensed clinic.3 9
As can be seen by the above cases, the abortion issue remains hotly
contested. The Court has been unsympathetic to the views of the states
wishing to restrict abortion beyond the limits allowed by Roe. With the
advent of Webster, the tide could be changing, and one may expect
even more litigation over the issue.
B. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: The Analysis
In 1986 suit was brought by three physicians, one nurse, and one
social worker employed by the state of Missouri and two nonprofit
organizations 4° challenging the constitutionality of several Missouri abor-
tion regulations. At issue in Webster were three provisions. They con-
cerned the prohibition of public employees from performing abortions,
the prohibition of public facilities for the performance of abortions,
and a viability testing requirement. Each will be discussed in turn, with
the prohibition against public employees and hospitals being discussed
together'.
4
C. Restrictions on the Use of Public Employees or Facilities for the
Performance of Abortions
The statutes in question provided that no public employee could
perform or assist an abortion, nor could a public facility be used for
38. 462 U.S. at 434-39, 103 S. Ct. at 2495-97.
39. See Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983). In this case,
the Court upheld the conviction of a physician who performed an abortion in an unlicensed
clinic. The patient, a minor who was five months pregnant, had aborted alone in a motel
bathroom.
40. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (the nonprofit organizations were Reproductive Health
Services and Planned Parenthood of Kansas City).
41. Two other Missouri statutes were on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
The first, the Missouri preamble, 1 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.205(1.1), (1.2) (Supp. 1990)
provided, among other things, that life begins at conception and unborn children have
protectable interests. The Court did not pass on the constitutionality of the preamble,
finding that it did not, in itself, restrict abortion. Louisiana has a similar provision, La.
R.S. 40:1299.35 (Supp. 1990). The second provision, 12 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.205 (Supp.
1990) provided that no public funds tould be used for encouraging or counseling a woman
to have an abortion unless it was necessary to save her life. The Court found that the
issue was moot as the appellees contended they were not adversely affected by the statute.
10951990]
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the performance of abortions.4 2 Both statutes contained exceptions for
abortions necessary to save the life of the mother. The Court found
the provisions constitutional as extensions of prior cases. In Maher v.
Roe, 43 the Court had upheld a provision providing for reimbursement
for services related to childbirth but not for abortion. In Poelker v.
Doe," the Court held that a city may refuse to provide publicly funded
hospitals for abortion when it does so for childbirth. Finally, in Harris
v. McRae,45 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal provision
providing that no federal funds would be used to reimburse abortion.
In Webster, the Court extended the reasoning used in these cases: that
the restrictions placed no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman
choosing an abortion. The refusal to allow public hospitals or employees
to be used for the performance of abortion "leaves a pregnant woman
with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to operate any
public hospitals at all."6 The Court found that neither physicians nor
their patients have any constitutional right to have their abortions per-
formed in public hospitals.4 7 In rejecting the Court of Appeals reasoning
that the state would redeem the cost of the abortion when the patient
paid, the Court stated, "Nothing in the Constitution requires States to
enter or remain in the business of performing abortions.
48
D. The Viability Testing Requirement
The most important of the three statutes at issue in Webster was
the one requiring that the physician determine the viability of the fetus
before performing the abortion. This issue is important not so much
42. 12 Mo. Ann Stat. § 188.210 (Supp. 1990) provides in pertinent part: "It shall
be unlawful for any public employee within the scope of his employment to perform or
assist an abortion, not necessary to save the life of the mother." 12 Mo. Ann. Stat. §
188.215 (Supp. 1990) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any public
facility to be used for the purpose of performing or assisting an abortion not necessary
to save the life of the mother ......
43. 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977). See supra text accompanying note 12.
44. 432 U.S. 519, 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977). See supra text accompanying note 18.
45. 448 U.S. 297, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980). See supra text accompanying note 15.
46. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989).
47. Id. As noted by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion, there might be
some applications of the prohibition on public facilities that are unconstitutional because
Missouri defines public facilities as "any public institution, public facility, public equip-
ment, or any physical asset owned, leased, or controlled by this state or any agency or
political subdivisions thereof." 12 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.200 (1) (Supp. 1990). So, con-
ceivably abortions could not be performed in hospitals that lease state land or hospitals
that use public water or sewerage lines. But because the provision is constitutional under
some circumstances, it survived the facial challenge. Id. at 3059-60 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment).
48. Id. at 3052.
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because of the holding, but because of the route taken by the plurality
in reaching the holding.
The provision in question requires that the physician perform tests
to determine viability when the pregnant woman is carrying a fetus
believed to be of twenty or more weeks of gestational age. 49 The plurality
held that this requirement was constitutional with Justices O'Connor
and Scalia concurring in the judgment. As noted by the plurality, "Sec-
tion 188.029 creates what is essentially a presumption of viability at
twenty weeks, which the physician must rebut with tests indicating that
the fetus is not viable prior to performing an abortion." 50
The Court believed the statute should be interpreted to mean that
the physician was required to perform "only those tests that are useful
to making subsidiary findings as to viability"51 and that he "apply his
reasonable professional skill and judgment. '5 2 Those tests that are not
relevant to the determination of the viability of the fetus or that would
be dangerous to the mother or the fetus are not required by the statute.
In discussing the viability statute, the plurality felt it necessary to
call into question the validity of the previous decisions in Colautti v.
Franklin" and Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health.5 4 The
Court in Colautti held that neither courts nor legislatures could dictate
the elements that should go into a physician's determination of viability.
The Court held in Akron that, among other reasons, a second trimester
hospitalization requirement was invalid because it imposed a substantial
increase in the cost of the abortion. The plurality believed that because
the viability testing requirement is a legislative determination of factors
to determine viability, it was not consistent with Colautti, and insofar
as it imposed additional costs on what might be second trimester abor-
tions, it was not consistent with Akron." Justice O'Connor, however,
49. 12 Mo. Ann Stat. § 188.029 (Supp. 1990) provides:
Before a physician performs an abortion on a woman he has reason to believe
is carrying an unborn child of twenty or more weeks gestational age, the physician
shall first determine if the unborn child is viable by using and exercising that
degree of care, skill, and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinarily
skillful, careful, and prudent physician engaged in similar practice under the
same or similar conditions. In making this determination of viability, the phy-
sician shall perform or cause to be performed such medical examination and
tests as are necessary to make a finding of the gestational age, weight, and
lung maturity of the unborn child and shall enter such findings and determination
of viability in the medical record of the mother.
50. 109 S. Ct. at 3055.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 439 U.S. 379, 99 S. Ct. 675 (1979).
54. 462 U.S. 416, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
55. Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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believed that the requirement could be upheld under the existing pre-
cedents, believing that under the statute the physician still had discretion
to determine viability and that the additional costs of the test did not
constitute an undue burden.5 6
This difference of opinion is important because if five members of
the court were to agree that Colautti and Akron were no longer valid,
states might have far greater power to regulate abortion. 7
E. The Fate of the Trimester Approach
In discussing the continued validity of the Colautti and Akron cases,
the plurality stated,
We think that the doubt cast upon the Missouri statute by these
cases is not so much a flaw in the statute as it is a reflection
of the fact that the rigid trimester analysis of the course of a
pregnancy indicated in Roe has resulted in subsequent cases like
Colautti and Akron making constitutional law in this area a
virtual Procrustean bed.58
The plurality felt that the trimester approach is "unsound in principle
and unworkable in practice," 5 9 and that it more closely resembled a
legislative enactment than a constitutional principle. 60 Justice Scalia agreed
with the plurality; indeed, he believed that Roe should be overruled
explicitly. 61 However, as noted above, Justice O'Connor did not think
such action was necessary for the resolution of the case. But she has
made it clear in past decisions that she believes the trimester approach
is outmoded and should be done away with. 62 Thus, there are currently
five Justices who believe the trimester approach to abortion regulations
should be overruled. 63
F. The State's Interest in the Fetus-A New Standard of Review?
The importance of Webster may not be so much in what it held
as in what it alluded to in dictum. It may be true, as Justice Blackmun's
56. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3060-64 (1989) (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 79-85, 104, and 124-27.
58. 109 S. Ct. at 3056.
59. Id. at 3056 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528, 546, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1015 (1985)).
60. Id. at 3057.
61. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62. See Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 828, 106 S.
Ct. 2169, 2213-14 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and Akron v. Akron Center for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453-54, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2505 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
63. Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and White.
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dissent says, that "[tihe plurality opinion is filled with winks, and nods,
and knowing glances to those who would do away with Roe explicitly," 64
or, as Justice Scalia says in his concurring opinion, "[T]he States [might]
have the constitutional power to prohibit it [abortion], and would do
so, but we skillfully avoid telling them so." '65
In overruling the trimester approach to abortion regulation, the
plurality stated, "[W]e do not see why the State's interest in protecting
potential life should come into existence only at the point of viability. ' '66
The Court states, "The State here has chosen viability as the point at
which its interest in potential life must be safeguarded. ' 67 These two
statements taken together imply that a state might be constitutionally
allowed to choose a point earlier in the pregnancy as the point at which
it wants to protect potential life. Although the plurality did not spe-
cifically indicate that conception could be a point at which the state
could protect the potential life, the quoted statements above indicate
that it might not be out of the question. Justice O'Connor has also
indicated that she believes the states have a compelling interest in the
life of the fetus throughout pregnancy. 68
Also important is the plurality's "permissibly furthers" test. In
holding the viability testing requirement valid, they stated, "We are
satisfied that the requirements of these tests permissibly further the
State's interest in protecting potential human life." '69 If the permissibly
furthers test is "nothing more than a dressed-up version of rational-
basis review, ' 70 as the dissent believes, then almost any state regulation
could be upheld as rationally related to the State's interest in protecting
potential life.
G. Justice O'Connor as the Swing Vote
Special note need be taken of Justice O'Connor's views as she is
regarded as the key vote.7" In Webster and previous decisions, 72 Justice
64. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3067 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Id. at 3066 (Scalia, J., concurring, in part and concurring in the judgment).
66. Id. at 3057.
67. Id.
68. See Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 828, 106 S.
Ct. 2481, 2213-14 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and Akron v. Akron Center for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 459-61, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2508-09 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
69. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057 (1989).
70. Id. at 3076 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. See Robertson, The Future of Early Abortion, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 72.
72. 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3063 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 828-30, 106
S. Ct. 2169, 2213-14 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461-66, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2509-11 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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O'Connor has made clear her preference for the "unduly burdensome
test." Under this test, "judicial scrutiny of state regulation of abortion
should be limited to whether the state law bears a rational relationship
to legitimate purposes such as the advancement of these compelling
interests, with heightened scrutiny reserved for instances in which the
State has imposed an 'undue burden' on the abortion decision."" Yet
Justice O'Connor also believes that the state has a compelling interest
in potential life throughout pregnancy. It is difficult to understand how
any law serving the state's compelling interest in potential life by pro-
hibiting first and second trimester abortions will not constitute an undue
burden on a woman's abortion decision under Justice O'Connor's test.
The concepts of the state's compelling interest in potential life and the
prohibition of first and second trimester abortions as an undue burden
are irreconcilable unless the "compelling" state interest is being used
differently than in the past: that the state's interest will not be enough
to outweigh the woman's choice to abort. In substantive due process
cases not only must a state have a compelling interest to regulate in
the protected area, but the regulation chosen must also be narrowly
tailored to serve the interest. Perhaps in Justice O'Connor's views, while
the state may have a compelling interest in the potential life throughout
pregnancy, criminalization of first and second trimester abortions may
be overly broad as a means of serving that interest.
It is hoped that Justice O'Connor will elucidate her position in the
coming abortion decisions. 74 For now, states wishing to restrict abortion
will have to legislate based on educated guesses.
II. LOUISIANA'S ABORTION LAWS: THE EFFECT OF Webster
An attempt will be made in this section to use Webster and previous
cases to judge the validity of Louisiana's abortion laws in the same
73. 476 U.S. 747, 828, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2214 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. Three abortion cases have been argued before the Supreme Court this term. The
decisions are expected some time during the Summer of 1990. They are Ragsdale v.
Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3239 (U.S. July 3,
1989) (No. 88-790) (concerning licensing requirements of abortion clinics); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (U.S. July 3,
1989) (Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309) (concerning parental notice requirements); and Akron Center
for Reprod. Health v. Slany, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. granted 109 S. Ct. 3239
(U.S. July 3, 1989) (No. 88-805) (also concerning parental notice requirements). Of the
three, Ragsdale v. Turnock has the greatest potential for affecting abortions during the
first two trimesters because the regulation in question there holds abortion clinics to
standards similar to hospitals. If such a regulation were upheld the cost of abortion could
rise making it difficult for many women to receive them.
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areas discussed above. 7" Suggestions for amendments and additions will
also be made.
1. Criminalization
Louisiana has a statute that makes any abortion criminal. 76 An
injunction was placed on the enforcement of this statute following Roe
v. Wade. Recently, in Weeks v. Connick,17 the District Attorney of New
Orleans attempted to dissolve the injunction to enforce the statute,
arguing that Webster significantly changed the law upon which the
injunction was based. The court, however, did not reach the issue,
deciding instead that Louisiana had implicitly repealed the criminal stat-
ute by enacting later legislation that regulated the abortion procedure.
Nevertheless, a statute making all abortions illegal would probably
not survive constitutional muster under Webster. Justice O'Connor, in
describing her undue burden test, has stated that heightened scrutiny
should be reserved for those situations where an absolute obstacle is
placed on the abortion decision. A statute making all abortions a crime
would seem to be such a situation.7 1
2. Prohibition of Public Funds, Employees, and Hospitals for
the Performance of Abortions
Louisiana has several statutes that are relevant to the issues of
prohibition of public funds, employees, and hospitals. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 40:1299.31A 79 provides that no person may be discriminated
against for refusing to participate in an abortion. Section 1299.3280
disallows prejudicial treatment of any institution that refuses to allow
the performance of abortion. Finally, Section 1299.33C1 reiterates Sec-
tion 1299.32 and adds that such institution shall never be denied gov-
ernmental assistance for refusing to perform abortions. There have never
been any cases interpreting or ruling on these statutes, but an opinion
of the Attorney General has said that while "physicians and supportive
75. The analysis of Louisiana's abortion laws will proceed under a federal analysis,
that is, as if Louisiana's Constitution were the same as the Federal Constitution. There
has been some debate over whether the Louisiana Constitution grants greater privacy
rights to its citizens than does the Federal Constitution. That issue is still under debate.
Support can be found that it does not afford greater rights in Hondroulis v. Schumacher,
546 So. 2d 466, 472-73 (La. 1989). The question will not be an issue in this article.
76. La. R.S. 14:87 (1986).
77. 733 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. La. 1990). Professor John Baker of the L.S.U. Law
Center represented the District Attorney, Harry Connick.
78. See supra text accompanying note 73.
79. La. R.S. 40:1299.31 (Supp. 1990).
80. La. R.S. 40:1299.32 (Supp. 1990).
81. La. R.S. 40:1299.33C (Supp. 1990).
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medical personnel who are unwilling to participate in the elective abortion
procedure because of moral or religious convictions cannot be required
to do so,1"82 public hospitals are required to open their facilities to
physicians that want to perform them. 3 The first finding states a basic
and accepted principle that no person opposed to abortions can be
required to perform them. The second finding is clearly erroneous after
Webster. Should Louisiana enact a statute prohibiting public hospitals
from performing abortions except when the life of the mother is in
danger, it would be constitutional. It would leave the pregnant woman
with the same range of choices as if Louisiana had chosen to operate
no public hospitals at all.14
But should Louisiana decide to prohibit public hospitals and em-
ployees from performing abortions, they should do so explicitly. The
statutes cited above do not carry out this task. The prohibition against
public hospitals and employees performing abortions is a constitutionally
protected way of encouraging childbirth over abortion and, in a state
where there is strong anti-abortion sentiment, such a prohibition would
make clear that, while the pregnant woman still may choose to abort,
the taxpayers would not be funding it through their hospitals and em-
ployees.
According to Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.34.5,3 the use of
public funds is prohibited "to assist in, or to provide facilities for an
abortion, except when the abortion is medically necessary to prevent
the death of the mother." Without the public facilities proviso, this
statute was clearly constitutional under prior decisions.8 6 As noted above,
because of Webster, the prohibition against the use of public facilities
is constitutional as well.
3. Parental and Spousal Consent or Notification
The Louisiana statute 7 concerning abortions performed on minors
has been held to be constitutional8 because it conforms to the standards
set by previous Supreme Court decisions.8 9 That is, a minor is required
to obtain the consent of a parent, legal guardian, or tutor or obtain
judicial consent. It is unclear whether a statute requiring parental consent
82. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-835 (1976).
83. Id.
84. See supra text accompanying note 46.
85. La. R.S. 40:1299.34.5 (Supp. 1990).
86. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977) and Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
87. See La. R.S. 40:1299.35.5 (Supp. 1990).
88. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984).
89. See Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979) and H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981).
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without the option of judicial consent would be constitutional. Under
Justice O'Connor's undue burden test such a requirement might im-
permissibly burden the abortion decision because the parent is given the
absolute right to veto the decision.
But there are valid reasons for enacting such a statute. Minors are
treated differently under law than are adults. For example, minors may
not marry below a certain age, may not make enforceable bargains,
and may not view adult movies.9 And although it may be argued that
the abortion decision is more important than any of the above activities,
that reasoning actually supports parental involvement. The judicial review
procedure involves a judge determining whether the minor is mature or
whether the abortion is in her best interest. But the Court has never
defined exactly what constitutes her level of maturity or her best interest.
Consequently, "a judge must rely on her subjective beliefs in reaching
a decision." 9' If the decision is going to be subjective, the logical choice
is to have the parent make it rather than a person who will have spent
only one afternoon with the minor. 92 Should Louisiana decide not to
enact a parental consent statute or should such a statute be held un-
constitutional, it should enact a parental notification statute. Louisiana
had such a statute93 but it was held unconstitutional. 94 However, such
a statute if reenacted would be constitutional, at least as applied to
immature, unemancipated minors, because of recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence on that issue. 95 Such a statute is worthy of reenactment.
It does not involve an undue burden upon the abortion decision as the
parent is not afforded the opportunity to veto the decision. Such a
statute would not only provide the minor with guidance over an im-
portant decision but would also notify the parent of his or her daughter's
sexual activity, of which they might have been unaware, thus, perhaps
giving the parent the opportunity to discuss contraceptive methods to
lessen the likelihood of another pregnancy.
Louisiana does not have a provision that requires spousal consent
or notification. Like a parental consent statute, it is possible that a
spousal consent statute would constitute an undue burden on the abortion
decision because the husband would be given a unilateral veto. However,
as has been recognized, "the husband has an interest of his own in the
90. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 95 n.2, 96 S. Ct.
2831, 2853 n.2 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Comment, The Viability of Parental Abortion Notification and Consent Statutes:
Assessing Fact and Fiction, 38 Am. U.L. Rev. 881, 897 (1989).
92. On the other hand, perhaps a judge would be less emotional about the decision
than a parent.
93. La. R.S. 40:1299.35.5(A)(1) (Supp. 1990).
94. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
95. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981).
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life of the fetus which should not be extinguished by the unilateral
decision of the wife." 96 There is Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing
the rights of fathers in other circumstances. 97 For example, in Caban
v. Mohammed, 98 the Court struck down a law giving a mother but not
a father of an illegitimate child the right to block the child's adoption.
The father had lived with the mother and the children for a number
of years. Such a situation is analogous to a spouse being deprived of
the choice to have a child without his consent. Of course, the important
distinction is that in Caban the father had lived with the children. But
such a distinction should not be dispositive. It is exactly because of the
mother's unilateral decision to abort that the husband is deprived of
the opportunity to live with the child as a family.
A spousal notification requirement would have a greater chance of
success than a spousal consent statute. A notification requirement would
probably not pose an undue burden because the father is not given the
opportunity to unilaterally veto the abortion decision. 99 Such a statute
would provide the father wiih the opportunity to at least plead his case,
so to speak, if he wants the mother to carry the child to term.
4. Viability Determinations and Post-Viability Abortions
Before proceeding into an examination of Louisiana's laws on this
subject, it should be noted that the viability distinction may soon become
obsolete. This is so because five Justices agree that the trimester approach
should be abandoned and that states have an interest in potential life
throughout pregnancy.' °° Thus, states that have had to be content in
protecting the potential life only at viability may soon have the op-
portunity to protect it earlier.
96. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 93, 96 S. Ct. 2831,
2852 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Of course, not every father of a fetus is the spouse of the mother. This note
concentrates on a spouse who is the father of the fetus. States might want to make
exceptions where the spouse was not the father. The state might also want to mandate
that the father of the fetus, though not the spouse of the mother, be notified. These
circumstances present special problem.
98. 441 U.S. 380, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
99. In Planned Parenthood of R.I. v. Bd. of Medical Rev., 598 F. Supp 625 (D.
R.I. 1984), the court found that a spousal notification requirement did constitute an
undue burden either inherently or as applied. Of course, such a finding is not binding
on the Supreme Court. Also, as the case was decided before Webster the court did not
take into account the compelling interests in the potential life. Thus, the Supreme Court
might decide that the state has its own interest in the potential life or it has a compelling
interest in protecting the interests of the father.
100. Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and White.
FAMILY LA W SYMPOSIUM
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.35.2B301 provides that a physician
who performs an abortion must perform an ultra-sound examination.10 2
This statute requires that this examination be performed at any time
during pregnancy. This provision was held unconstitutional in Margaret
S. v. Treen10 3 because it was an unacceptable burden on a woman's
fundamental right to have an abortion and the state had no compelling
interest.
It is very difficult to determine whether this provision would now
be constitutional. An argument can be made that it would be consti-
tutional because Justice O'Connor, the swing vote, believes that increased
costs are not an undue burden on the abortion decision °4 And as the
new standard of review for abortion regulation might be whether the
regulation furthers a state's compelling interest in potential life, then it
is possible that any additional costs would be allowable.
An argument can be made that such an approach should not be
taken. The court in Treen found that the tests were not necessary to
determine the correct method of abortion, and that they were over
inclusive as a means of determining life-threatening conditions-reasons
that the state had used to justify the tests. 05 Imposing costs for costs
sake alone may seem to some to be an unacceptable method for limiting
the number of abortions performed.
On the other hand, as a purpose of the ultra-sound examination is
to determine the gestational age of the fetus there may be a valid
purpose for the tests. If the pregnant woman can be constitutionally
required to know the anatomical and physiological development of the
fetus before she has an abortion,'0 the tests would serve the function
of aiding the physician in obtaining that information.
Louisiana also has a statute0 7 that provides that no abortion may
be performed after viability; that the physician shall certify the reasons
for an abortion after viability; that the physician with a choice of
methods must use the one to save the fetus unless it would affect the
life or health of the mother; that a second physician is required to be
in attendance for an abortion performed after viability; and that the
101. La. R.S. 40:1299.35.2(B) (Supp. 1990).
102. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1511 (24th ed. 1982), defines ultrasonography as
the "location, measurement, or delineation of deep structures by measuring the reflection
or transmission of high frequency or ultrasonic waves."
103. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984).
104. At least she believes that costs as high as second trimester hospitalization does
not constitute an undue burden. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462
U.S. 416, 466, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2512 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Costs for ultra-
sound tests would be substantially less.
105. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 648-50 (E.D. La. 1984).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 116-18.
107. La. R.S. 40:1299.35.4 (Supp. 1990).
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physicians in attendance shall take reasonable steps to preserve the life
and health of the child while the primary objective is to protect the
life and health of the mother. Although this statute has not been
addressed by our courts, it would probably be unconstitutional, at least
in part, because the second physician requirement does not provide an
exception for emergencies.108
Louisiana may now amend this statute to create a presumption of
viability at twenty weeks of pregnancy that a physician must rebut with
tests to indicate that the fetus is not viable. Because five Justices agree
that the state has an interest in potential life throughout pregnancy,
Louisiana might forbid abortion at a point before viability, although
when that point becomes an undue burden remains unclear.' °9
Louisiana might also wish to enact a law that mandates that the
abortion method chosen for abortions after viability must be the one
that affords the best opportunity for the fetus to survive, unless it
involves a significantly greater health risk to the mother. This requirement
has been held unconstitutional because it "require[s] a 'trade-off' between
the woman's health and fetal survival." 110 This type of statute should
be constitutional after Webster as preserving the state's compelling in-
terest in potential life. There is no reason that a method such as saline
amniocentesis, a method where there is little chance of fetal survival, '
should be used in a post-viability abortion when another method could
be used that would not cause any appreciable risk to the mother. Of
course, the pregnant woman should not be required to undergo an
abortion procedure that would be life-threatening or involve the threat
of serious injury to save the life of the child; but even Roe holds that
the state's interest in the fetus after viability is compelling. Thus, the
physician should be required to use a method to preserve the life of
the fetus if that method involves only minor health complications to
the mother.
5. Informed Consent
Louisiana has tried several versions of informed consent provisions.
The state may require the pregnant woman be informed that public and
private agencies are available to assist her should she decide to keep
108. See supra text accompanying note 27.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
110. Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 768, 106 S. Ct.
2169, 2183 (1986). See supra text accompanying note 26.
111. See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 199 n.59 (E.D. La. 1980).
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the child or place him for adoption, ' 2 to be informed that public mental
health agencies are available if and when post-partum psychological
damage requires professional attention," 3 to be informed of the abortion
method to be employed and the risks associated with the procedure,
and to be given instructions to follow subsequent to the abortion."1
4
Also held constitutional was a requirement that the physician provide
the pregnant woman with a copy of the form."'
The court held that a requirement that the pregnant woman be
informed of the anatomical and physiological development of the fetus
at the time the abortion is performed was unconstitutional." 6 It is unclear
whether this provision would now be constitutional. The provision was
found invalid because, among other reasons, it is difficult to determine
the age of the fetus during the early stages of pregnancy. The solution
is to require ultra-sound tests to determine the age," 7 and if that is not
possible,"' to require the physician to estimate and give the characteristics
for ages surrounding that estimate or to require the disclosure only
when fetal age is certain. Another reason this provision was declared
invalid was that the information is irrelevant to a woman's decision and
it "impermissibly burdens the outcome of the abortion decision."" 9
That such a requirement was held unconstitutional is an enigma. It
is a strange notion that the Constitution requires that women not know
this information. In the first place, if a woman received information
that her fetus was at a certain stage of development and decided to
carry the child, that information has become relevant. Secondly, an
abortion is not like removing a tooth or tumor. It involves cutting off
a potential life. That alone justifies some structuring of the dialogue
between the physician and the pregnant woman. 20 Of course it may be
argued that the requirement of such disclosure would increase the guilt
112. Id. at 211-12. However, a later U.S. Supreme Court decision held a similar
requirement invalid. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103
S. Ct. 2481 (1983). Such a provision would probably be constitutional after Webster. It
does not constitute an undue burden and it facilitates the state's purpose of informing
the pregnant woman that options, other than abortion, exist.
113. 488 F. Supp. at 211.
114. Id. at 205-12.
115. Id.
116. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 661-65 (E.D. La. 1984).
117. See supra text accompanying note 102.
118. Either because requiring an ultra-sound test is found unconstitutional or because
the test cannot determine the age.
119. 597 F. Supp. at 662.
120. One reason given for the unconstitutionality of such a disclosure requirement was
that it was an unacceptable attempt to structure the dialogue between the pregnant woman
and her physician. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103
S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
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of the pregnant woman should she decide to undergo the abortion. It
may be that while the state has an interest in making sure the woman
knows the enormity"' of her decision by requiring the disclosure, such
disclosure would constitute an undue burden on the woman by increasing
the guilt she may feel after the abortion.
Because such a blanket requirement might face constitutional dif-
ficulties, Louisiana might want to adopt a requirement that the pregnant
woman be informed of the physiological and anatomical characteristics
of the fetus should she so choose. Such a requirement would not place
an undue burden on the abortion decision and would serve the state's
interest in potential life.
Louisiana might also want to enact a provision that requires the
pregnant woman be informed of Louisiana laws regarding child support,
that is, that the father of the child is legally responsible for support.
This may be relevant to a woman who is choosing an abortion solely
because she has little or no means of support. While it may be true
that "a victim of rape should not have to hear gratuitous advice that
an unidentified perpetrator is liable for support if she continues the
pregnancy to term,' 1 22 the solution is to make an exception for those
cases. 21 With the current make-up of the Court, such a provision would
likely be valid.
6. Regulation of the Place Where the Abortion is Performed
A statute' 24 requiring all abortions be performed in a hospital after
the first trimester was held unconstitutional in Margaret S. v. Treen.'21
Such a law would probably now be constitutional.' 26 It might be argued
that Louisiana should not require that all second trimester abortions be
performed in a hospital. Such requirements have been held unconsti-
tutional because the dilation and evacuation method of abortion can be
performed safely in an outpatient setting during the early weeks of the
121. That is the real purpose of such a disclosure requirement. They are designed to
make the woman think twice about such an important decision. It is hoped. that by
making the woman aware of the development of the fetus, she will be sensitized to the
fact that the fetus is actually a developing human being.
122. Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 763, 106 S. Ct.
2169, 2180 (1986).
123. Pregnancies that result from rape should never be used as the sole reason for
invalidating an abortion statute, because, of the number of abortions performed, very
few of the pregnancies were the result of rape.
124. La. R.S. 40:1299.35.3 (Supp. 1990).
125. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984).
126. Justice O'Connor, the swing vote, dissented from the case that found such a
requirement unconstitutional. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
416, 452, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2504 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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second trimester, thus the Court has held all second trimesters may not
be required to be performed in hospitals.1 27 Such reasoning does not
support the abolition of the trimester approach, that is, disallowing state
regulation during part of a trimester when it would be protective of
the mother because during the other part of the trimester, it is not.
But by the same token, it may be illogical to require hospitalization
when it does not serve to protect the mother, especially because there
is no chance of fetal survival during the early stages of the second
trimester. On the other hand, such a requirement might decrease the
number of abortions because the cost of hospitalization for many women
would be prohibitive. Because of the Court's refusal to reexamine whether
abortion is a fundamental right in Webster, states like Louisiana, which
might prohibit all abortions if constitutionally permitted, have been left
to take whatever scraps they can get. Decreasing the number of abortions
by raising the costs seems to be the way the Court is going to allow
states to limit abortions.
III. CONCLUSION
An attempt has been made in this article to show what Louisiana
could do to restrict abortion should the legislators and the citizens decide
that it is in their interest to restrict the laws to the extent allowed by
Webster. As indicated above, there have been more issues left unresolved
than answered in the decision. The decision has left Louisiana and other
states in doubt as to the extent to which they may restrict abortions.
It is unclear what sort of abortion regulation will be required for the
Court to reexamine Roe. It may be, as Justice Scalia states, that they
"will not reconsider [Roe], even if most of the Justices think it is wrong,
unless we have before us a statute that in fact contradicts it-and even
then . . . only minor problematical aspects of Roe will be reconsidered,
unless one expects State legislators to adopt provisions whose compliance
with Roe cannot even be argued with a straight face. '"' 28 And it may
be, again in the words of Justice Scalia, that "Roe v. Wade must be
disassembled door-jamb by door-jamb, and never entirely brought down,
no matter how wrong it may be.' ' 29
Although Webster did not reach the issue of the validity of the
abortion right as described in Roe, there are now three decisions pending
before the Supreme Court that concern abortion regulation. 30 It is to
be hoped that the Justices will elucidate their views on the standard to
127. 462 U.S. 416, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
128. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3066-67 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
129. Id. at 3067 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
130. See supra note 74.
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be applied for abortion regulations and the extent of the state's allowable
interest in the potential life.
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